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ABSTRACT.  Postwar northern political  history is interpreted  as  a  compressed  reiteration of older patterns of Canadian development. It is argued  that 
Native  people and  northerners  have  reacted  to  two  contradictory  tendencies  in  the  Canadian  constitutional  tradition:  liberal  individualism  and  Tory 
top-down  pragmatism.  The  general  argument is that  understanding  current  northern  debates in  this  way  exposes  some  grounds  for  long-term  optimism 
about  aboriginal  and  territorial self-government. 
Key  words:  territorial political  development,  federal northern  administration 
RÉSUMÉ. On interprkte l’histoire politique du  Nord depuis la dernibre guerre comme la ri@tition, en accéléré, des schémas antérieurs de 
développement du  Canada.  L’auteur  soutient  que  les  indigbnes et  les habitants  du  Nord  ont  réagi h deux  tendances  contradictoires  dans  la  tradition 
constitutionnelle du  Canada, h savoir  l’individualisme  des libéraux et  le  pragmatisme  des  conservateurs  qui  s’exerçait  de haut n  bas.  L’idée  générale  est 
de démontrer  qu’A  partir de  cette  ligne  de  pensée,  la  compréhension  des  débats  actuels sur le Nord  débouche  sur un optimisme 1 long terme  quant à 
un auto-gouvernement  aborigbne  et  territorial. 
Mots clés: ddveloppement  politique  territorial,  administration  fédérale  du  Nord 
Traduit  pour le  journal  par Nésida  Loyer. 
INTRODUCTION 
A sympathetic  friend  from France asked  a  very  simple  question 
this  summer:  Why  does  Canada exist? As  an  economist  aware of 
the powerful  tug  of  the  United States economy, and  a  citizen of a 
nation  with  much  more cultural coherence, he  meant:  How does 
Canada survive? 
His  question  prompted  an  hour of increasingly  involved  and 
perhaps not very persuasive explanation from the Canadians 
present. We  were  not  surprised that explanation was so difficult. 
Canadians are accustomed  to  this  problem. 
In  this essay, I  propose  that one account of Canada’s  survival 
is  to  be  found  in  a c reful reading  of the recent  political  history 
of Canada’s two northern territories. When the question of 
Canadian  identity arises, it  has  been  traditional for politicians 
(like  John  Diefenbaker)  and  writers  (Pierre  Berton  and  Farley 
Mowat) to invoke northern imagery. Recent  northern  political 
history  has revealed, however, that  the  old  northern  images  are 
mere romance. Native peoples’ political mobilization, their 
communication of their own  interpretation of northern  reality 
and their plans for the North’s future have fundamentally 
changed  the way  in  which the  North  is  comprehended. 
This change has only  increased  the  importance  of  understand- 
ing  northern  political  and  economic issues; “the North” contin- 
ues  to  be evocative. This is so because  recent  northern  political 
development  has  been  a  compressed  reiteration of earlier  national 
struggles  and dilemmas, and  because  current  outstanding  issues 
in the  North crystallize major  national concerns. 
To make this case, I must rely upon some undefended 
generalizations about the characteristic patterns of Canadian 
development.  These  generalizations arenot  universally  accepted, 
but  neither  are  they idiosyncratic. They are developed  from  the 
works  cited  in  the  next  section  of the paper. The generalizations 
frame a narrative overview of the major phases in northern 
political history, with emphasis upon  the last 40 years. 
Considering  the  recent  period in this way exposes its  continu- 
ity  with  the  rest  of  Canadian development. The continuity is 
related to contradictions in Canadian  conceptions of the  role of 
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the  state  and  the  nature of democracy and to the  persistence of 
the  ‘:National Policy” economic  development strategy. When 
the  similarities  are xposed, differences become  more obvious. 
The most  important  of  these  is that, in contrast to  the  situation  in 
the rest of the country, the foundations of northern constitu- 
tional practice have  not solidified, nor has the  economy of the 
North  fully  taken shape. Very great national  issues still hang  in 
the  balance. 
COLONIAL  DOMINION  PATTERNS OF CANADIAN  DEVELOPMENT 
Canada as a politically independent nation has known a 
protracted gestation. It was over 50 years after Confederation in 
1867  before  Canadian  representatives  spoke f r Canada  interna- 
tionally  without  British sponsorship. The written  constitution 
was patriated over a century after Confederation, and  we  are still 
completing the long collective labour to agree  upon  a  written 
text. 
There are good  reasons for the difficult birth. We  began  with 
a  hybrid form, a federal structure grafted to the  parliamentary 
model  that  evolved  in tiny, unitary, imperial  England.  From  the 
beginning, compromise has been important. The presence of 
Quebec,  and  of  francophones in other provinces, has  compelled 
recognition of difference. There have  been  repeated attempts to 
accommodate the goal of equal treatment to the reality of 
cultural  differences (Russell, 1977; Forsey, 1962). 
Compromise has also been difficult. Colonial patterns of 
government  prevailed  through  small-holder  rebellions in Upper 
and  Lower  Canada  in  the 1830s, during  the  negotiations  that 
produced Confederation, and after 1867  during  the  consolida- 
tion of Dominion control over the lands north and west of 
Ontario (Thomas, 1978; Whitaker, 1977). The old  written 
constitution, the  British  North  America  Act  (now  the  Constitu- 
tion [ 18671) soberly divides jurisdiction and  revenue  opportu- 
nities  between  two levels of government  and  carefully delineates 
the  extent of religious  and educational expression  for  franco- 
phone,  Roman  Catholic  Quebec. The machinery of government 
is outlined as a function of executive prerogative, not as an 
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expression of  the citizens’ will. To the  extent  that  systematic 
expression of the  will of the  people  was  considered at Confeder- 
ation, it  is clear that  all drafters assumed  that  Canadian practice 
would  follow  the  British  parliamentary  model  and  that  practices 
in Canada would evolve here as conditions dictated. This 
assumption  persists as the “unwritten” part of our constitution. 
Thus  the  Constitution  (1 867) lacks  the  inspiring  revolutionary 
rhetoric of, for example, the  American constitution, as well  as 
any  reference to responsible  government  (control of the  budget 
by elected officials) or to individual rights. 
Constitutions  record  the  balance of social forces  in  the  nations 
for  which  they  are written. The British  North  America  Act  was 
drafted by a fractious colonial elite who  conceived  the  Canadian 
state  as a solution to various  problems of markets  and  capitaliza- 
tion  created by American  protectionism  and  expansionism  and 
the  waning  of  commercial  privileges  granted to British  colonies 
(Dawson, 1970:20-39). These conditions determined that the 
state  would  play from the  beginning  an  active  role  in  creating a 
domestic economy.  The Fathers of Confederation  used  the new 
Canadian state to  borrow  the  capital  needed  to  build a transcon- 
tinental  transportation system, to displace western  indigenous 
peoples  with  no  more  than  the  necessary  level of coercion, to 
import a labour force, and to raise  tariff  barriers  that  protected 
central  Canadian  manufacturing  from U.S. competition. This 
was the National Policy of 1878-79, a program that worked 
reasonably well for 50 years. In a favourable international 
market setting, a national  economy  was  created  in  which 
western farmers produced  wheat for export  while  providing a 
captive  market  for  manufactured  goods from central Canada. 
Capital  drained  steadily from the  old  commercial centres of the 
Maritimes to central Canada  (Fowke, 1973; Paquet, 1968). 
The state that  achieved  these feats cannot be  seen  as luissez- 
fuire. A luissezlfuire state is minimalist, an  umpire  restrained 
from active intervention in the economy except where it is 
necessary to enforce the rules of fair competition by protecting 
the rights of individual economic and political actors (Rea, 
1968). Early  Canadian  conceptions of the  role of the state were 
“Tory,” the old form of British conservatism elaborated by 
Edmund Burke and by Canada’s pre-Confederation colonial 
administrators (Whitaker,  1977;  Goodwin, 1961). In  the  Tory 
conception, the state is seen as an instrument for promoting 
capitalist  development by pragmatic  intervention  where  market 
forces fail or are absent. 
In Canada, the  Tory  conception  of  the  role  of  the state has 
always  contained  contradictory tendencies. First, there has been 
the  expectation  that  sooner or later the  time  would  come for the 
state to withdraw.  After  the  motor f capitalist development  had 
been started, the state was  expected to become  more luissez- 
fuire, more  appropriate to a “normal” capitalist liberal  democ- 
racy. Canada’s  geography  and  the federal system, among  other 
factors, have  inhibited  realization of this goal. The federal state 
remained important for “regional development” and other 
forms of capital redistribution  and for protection  of  sovereignty 
on the frontiers. Entrepreneurs located outside the centre of 
power have pressed alternately for Tory interventions more 
suited  to their needs  and for liberation from the  heavy  hand of 
state policy. 
There have  also  been countervailing pressures  ‘‘from below, ” 
in  the  form  of resistance to the  top-down  Tory  administrative 
style. The state, used so unself-consciously  by  merchants  and 
landholders to create a national economy, was pressed to 
provide the preconditions of better lives to the rest of the 
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population. In often isolated  battles  all over the country, work- 
ers, Native peoples, farmers, women,  and  religious  dissenters 
fought for political, economic, and social rights. These  strug- 
gles  generated  political  movements  and  political  ideas  with a 
strong “regional” flavour. They  all  challenged  the  commercial 
alliance  and  Tory  philosophy  through  which  Canada  was  born. 
The Metis revolt in the late 19th century, Native resistance 
elsewhere in the country, the prairie farmers’ movement, the 
Social Gospel  movement, women’s  struggles  for  the vote, and 
socialist  labour  organizations  all  attacked  in  different  ways  the 
economic  and political terms of Confederation. 
Warfare,  conquest, coercion, evacuation, civil disobedience, 
resistance, and great struggles  have  transformed  Canadian life. 
In this process, we did not forge a national mythology of 
revolutionary achievement, as similar events have done in, for 
example, the  United States or France.  This aspect of  our legacy 
is  instead a tradition  of gradual, piecemeal, unremarked  reform 
worked painfully through the Byzantine architecture of 
federalism. 
The entire history of federal northern  administration  reflects 
these  national  patterns. The northern  territories  were  administered 
for decades  as colonies of the South, at first  lackadaisically  and 
then, after World War 11, with sudden energy.  The National 
Policy strategy, which  had  opened the West, was  revived for the 
North, like a recurring dream, whenever it appeared  that  north- 
ern  resource  development  was possible. Repeatedly, the  dream 
faded when geography and changes in the world economy 
frustrated  development (Paquet, 1968:41-42). 
In  the last 40 years, northern  challenges to colonial  adminis- 
tration, the  National  Policy  development s rategy, and  the  tradi- 
tionally  halting  pace  of  Canadian constitutional change  have 
occupied centre stage. Because  the  territorial  North  is  home  to 
distinct, self-conscious, and  proportionately  numerous  Native 
societies, as well as to a settler population, northerners  confront 
the familiar questions of ethnic particularity and equal 
participation. 
EARLY  DOMINION  ADMINISTRATION 
The Dominion  government  purchased “Rupert’s Land and 
the North-West”  from the  Hudson’s  Bay  Company  in  1870; in 
1880, Great  Britain  transferred to Canada jurisdiction over the 
Arctic Islands. For  decades after, however, the  federal state was 
preoccupied  with  national  consolidation  south of the 60th paral- 
lel. Relations with indigenous and migrant northerners were 
conducted  almost absent-mindedly, on a crisis basis. Attention 
was  drawn  northward episodically, by the  threat of  American 
annexation of Canadian  lands  and by short-lived  concentrations 
of non-Native  settlement  that  attended  mineral developments. 
Mineral “discoveries” by  migrants  provoked  brief  spurts of 
enthusiasm  in  the  South for northern development. Where  these 
discoveries  led to production (in the  Yukon  after  1898  and  at 
Norman Wells after 1921), Dominion regulations were duly 
drafted, following principles similar to those  used to encourage 
mineral  development  in  the rest of the  country (Zaslow, 1973; 
Martin, 1973). As was  the practice in the South, treaties  were 
sought  with  northern  Native societies only  where  open  conflict 
threatened  between  migrants  and  indigenous people. No  treaty 
was  ever  signed  with  Yukon Indians or with  the  Inuit  of  the 
Arctic. Treaty Eight (1898) and Treaty Eleven (1921) were 
negotiated hastily with the indigenous peoples of northern 
Alberta  and  Saskatchewan  and  with  the  Dene of the Mackenzie 
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Valley  when  fortune  seekers  invaded  these  lands  and  disrupted 
Native  land  use (Fumoleau, 1973; Thomas, 1978). 
The  Yukon  Territory  was  created  in  1898  in  response  to  the 
Klondike  gold rush. The gold  rush  drew  a  large  and  heterogene- 
ous population of non-Natives to an  area  barely  within  the  reach 
of  Dominion  authority.  Eventually,  the  presence of these  migrants 
and  fears  in  Ottawa  of  American  annexation  led to the  creation 
of the Yukon Territory and the establishment of a territorial 
government in the  Yukon.  While  the  migrant  population  remained 
large, there  was  some  experimentation  with  intermediary  forms 
of responsible government, but  these  were  abandoned in favour 
of a contracted and less democratic territorial state structure 
during  the 1920s, as gold fever and  the  migrant  population  both 
ebbed (Coates, 1985; Morrison, 1968). 
The current  boundaries of  the  Northwest  Territories (N.  W.T.) 
delineate  the  land  that  remained after the  staged  extension of 
provincial  boundaries  northward  and  the  creation of  the  Yukon 
Territory  and  the  new  provinces of Saskatchewan  and  Alberta. 
The Northwest Territories Act (1905) established  a fairly broad 
legislative  framework for the  self-government of  the N.W.T., 
including jurisdiction in many areas of provincial authority. 
Until the 1950s, however, the powers listed in the act were 
exercised by a  small group of Dominion civil servants  resident 
in Ottawa. 
The  human  population  of  the  territorial  North  was left largely 
in  a “state of nature.” Social services  were  provided  by 
non-state  institutions  (principally  the  fur-trading  companies  and 
the churches) and  in  different  ways by the  indigenous  peoples 
and  the settlers for themselves. The only permanent state 
representatives were the Royal North-West Mounted Police, 
whose  presence  was  used  both to maintain  sovereignty  and to 
keep  the peace. While  Dominion  policy  towards  Native  people 
in  southern  Canada  had  the  official objective of  making  them 
“good, industrious and useful citizens” by settling them on 
reserves  and  replacing  the  hunt  with agriculture, it was  felt  that 
northern Native  people ought best  ‘‘follow  their  natural  mode f 
living  and  not . . . depend  upon  white  men’s  food  and  clothing 
which are unsuited to their needs” (Fumoleau, 1973; Judd, 
1969b:  1  1). 
THE  NEW  APPROACH:  A  PROBLEM OF DEVELOPMENT? 
Early  federal interest in  northern  Canada  was  sporadic  and 
slight. The Dominion  government  was  preoccupied  with  west- 
ern development, intervening in the  North  only  when  mineral 
discoveries  suggested  that  there  was  opportunity for economic 
development or threats to Canadian  sovereignty.  The  Second 
World War and the global changes that followed completely 
transformed  the federal stance. 
With Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the western 
continental  Arctic  became  an area of  potential strategic impor- 
tance. American military personnel rapidly constructed the 
Alaska  Highway,  a  winter  road from the  Mackenzie  Valley  to 
Alberta,  the  Canol pipeline, and  an oil refinery  in Whitehorse, 
all  in  anticipation  of  the  need to efend  against  an  invasion  from 
the  Pacific (Coates, 1985). The U.S. military effort had amajor 
impact.  David  Judd has estimated  that  between 1941 and 1946, 
the  American  military  population in northern  Canada 
outnumbered  Canadian  residents  three to one (Judd, 1969a). 
The  advent of the  Cold War immediately after the  defeat of 
Germany  and  Japan  sustained  northern  military activity. Mili- 
tary personnel  in  reduced  numbers  remained  in  several  loca- 
tions, and  in  the  1950s  weather  and  radar  systems  were 
F. ABELE 
constructed, while scientific research  and  military  training 
exercises continued. 
All  of  this  activity  created  powerful  incentives  for  the devel- 
opment of a  new federal approach to northern  administration. 
The  American  military  presence  in  the  North  raised  concerns  for 
Canadian sovereignty. Concern for sovereignty  provoked  some 
delicate diplomatic maneuvering. It also created interest in 
establishing  a more effective state presence  in  the  North 
(Armstrong et al., 1978; Judd, 1969a). 
Reinforcing  this interest were  two other factors. First, mili- 
tary  activity  in  the  North  had  begun to create the  technology  and 
an infrastructure that promised to render northern resource 
development practical, while  global  markets for these  resources 
were forming. As a part of the war effort, a new office was 
created  within  the  Department of Mines  and  Resources  in  1943 
to  gather  information  about  northern geography, resources, and 
population. This office produced  a report, Canada’s  New 
Northwest (1947), which  treated  the  region  as  an  economic  unit 
of potential  importance to the  national economy. Both  Liberal 
and  Progressive  Conservative  governments in the  decades fol- 
lowing  incorporated  the same reasoning  in  their  national eco- 
nomic policies. 
The Liberal  government of Louis St. Laurent  recognized  in 
the  expanding  American  economy  opportunities to market  north- 
ern  resources  and  found  in  the  strong state instruments  devel- 
oped  during  the  war  the  means to promote  northern  resources 
development. Later, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker gave 
vivid  political expression to the same economic strategy. 
In Diefenbaker’s “Northern  Vision,” the North was to be 
opened by means of a “new National Policy” (Coates, 1985; 
Rea, 1968).  The North, like the  west 50 years earlier, would 
provide staple export commodities. Northern minerals, like 
western  wheat  in  an earlier period, would fuel the  engine of  the 
national  economy by providing export credits, jobs, and  invest- 
ment  opportunities. The role of the  federal  state  would  be to 
facilitate resource  development. A Territorial  Roads  program 
and  a “Roads to Resources” policy  were announced, a  railway 
was  constructed to Pine Point, and  new  oil  and  gas  regulations 
were  drafted to promote exploration. 
Increased penetration of the North by southerners had a 
second effect. It  created  a  much  greater  awareness  in  southern 
Canada of the circumstances of northern indigenous people. 
Native northerners were suffering economic hardships as a 
result of a sharp decline in world fur prices, and they were 
exposed to new diseases from the South. There were well- 
publicized  reports  of starvation. In  a  period of national  expan- 
sion of social  welfare services and  continued  federal  presence  in 
the North, it was  impossible to sustain  the  old “state of nature” 
policy. 
The state response to this imperative was compatible in 
certain respects with northern resource development. It also 
represented  the  extension of full-scale colonial  administration to 
the territorial North. The full administrative apparatus was 
established  very quickly. 
Low-rent  housing  was  provided  in settlements, to which  the 
nomadic  and  scattered  Native  societies  were  induced  and  per- 
suaded to relocate. The population was brought together to 
facilitate  delivery of educational, medical, and  social services. 
Also for this purpose, the  Inuit  were  assigned “ isc  numbers” to 
make  record-keeping  possible for southerners  unfamiliar  with 
Inuit  naming  customs  and  language.  As  early as 1949, efforts 
were begun to bring Native children into the school system. 
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Over  a  few years, the  old  church-run  hostel  schools  were  taken 
over  and new primary  and  post-primary  schools constructed. 
Church-run hospitals were also absorbed into a new public 
health system, which  incorporated  a  system  of  nursing stations 
in small  communities  and  provision of advanced  treatment  at 
larger facilities in the South. 
Family allowance payments were introduced in the North 
soon after their 1944 introduction in the South. By the early 
1960s, virtually all Native and non-Native northerners were 
receiving  the  full  panoply of social welfare transfer payments, 
including  old  age pension, social assistance, disabled  and  blind 
person’s allowance and, for waged workers, unemployment 
insurance. 
During 1949-53, individual  and group trap line registration 
was  introduced  in  both territories to regulate  game  harvesting. 
Programs  were  begun 
to encourage natives to develop  agricultural  activities  where  this 
seemed possible, to stimulate the growth of home and handicraft 
industries, to instruct and interest natives in the economical 
management of fur, fish and other wildlife resources, and even 
to operate retail stores. [Rea, 1968:37-39.1 
There  were  even  programs to teach  Native  women “housekeep- 
ing” skills. 
In  all of these measures, it is  possible to discern  a new federal 
interpretation of the  situation of Native  people (see Jenness, 
1968; Robertson, 1960). Their  hardships  were  understood as a 
consequence  of ‘ ‘disadvantage. ” Besides  emergency  measures 
to  deal  with  immediate problems, there  was another, longer  term 
strategy to overcome Native peoples’ disadvantaged circum- 
stances by ensuring  their full and equal participation as Cum- 
dian  citizens in  both  the  wage  conomy  and  the  formal 
political process. In retrospect, the  striking  thing  about 
the  new  approach  was  the extent to which it was  devel- 
oped  without consultation with  the  people  towards  whom 
it was directed. But  retrospective judgements are  too 
easily  made:  in  this period, only  a  handful  of  people  in 
Canada had any level of knowledge about northern Native 
societies, communication  with  and  among these societies 
was  inhibited by linguistic, technological, and  geographi- 
cal barriers, and there were powerful economic and social 
welfare  incentives for proceeding quickly. 
Further, there  were  measures  designed to improve the politi- 
cal  representation  of  northerners  and  attempts to prepare  Native 
northerners for political participation. Like the social welfare 
and  economic  development measures, most  of  these  attempts 
were coloured by non-Native assumptions about appropriate 
pace  and  means  and  by  a reluctance in  Ottawa to devolve  power. 
In  this period, little was done to improve  the  political  represen- 
tation of Yukoners; instead, steps were taken to bring the 
Northwest Territories to the level of self-government  already 
long  established  in  Yukon. 
Yukoners  who  were  not status Indians had  elected  a  represen- 
tative to the  federal  Parliament since 1902. In 1947, the  Yukon 
constituency was extended to include the western Northwest 
Territories, and  then  in 1952, in  response to regional protest, a 
separate  constituency  was  established for the Mackemie Dis- 
trict.  In 1954, provisions  were  made for the Inuit of the  Eastern 
Arctic to vote. Status Indians across the  country  were  given the 
right to  vote in federal  elections  finally in 1960 (Rea, 
In stages beginning  in 195  1, the N. W.T.  Territorial  Council 
gained  gradually  a greater proportion  of  elected  members. A 
1968~43-45). 
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federal Commission of Inquiry led by A.W.R. Carrothers 
resulted in the relocation of the seat of N.W.T. government 
from  Ottawa to Yellowknife  in 1967 and over the  next  few  years 
the transfer of administrative responsibilities to the N.W.T. 
Appointed  members  remained on the council until 1975, and  the 
commissioner retained a seat in the executive council until 
1984. Until  very  recently  in  both territories, the  commissioners 
remained  very powerful. They  were  responsible to the  federal 
cabinet, and the federal government retained the power to 
disallow territorial legislation and to alter territorial budgets 
(Dacks, 1981). 
In  the 1950s, there  were  attempts also to stimulate  municipal 
government  participation  in  northern  communities.  Most  com- 
munities  were  provided  with  a federal administrator, the  North- 
ern Service Officer (NSO), who established in his assigned 
community  a  settlement council of  elected  representatives to 
deal  with  matters  of  municipal concern.  The intention  of  these 
initiatives  was  apparently to train  northern  Native  people  in  the 
forms of liberal democratic  self-government, but  in  this  respect 
the  early local government efforts were  largely  unsuccessful. 
The language  barrier for community  adults  and their unfamiliar- 
ity with representative majority decision-making procedures 
discouraged Native participation, as did a  marked  power 
imbalance  expressed  in  the  position of the  NSO. 
It was the NSO’s role to relay  the  expressed  needs of the 
communities to headquarters  in  Ottawa  and to relay  Ottawa’s 
decisions  back to the community. Because  little  power  and  no 
budgetary control were  devolved to the communities, the  NSO 
was frequently in the position of representing Ottawa more 
effectively  locally  than he was able to represent  the  community 
in Ottawa.  There was  thus  relatively little incentive for Native 
residents to overcome the other barriers to their participation  in 
settlement councils (Brody, 1975; Bean, 1977). Many Inuit 
found it more effective to write directly to Ottawa, in syllabics, 
with specific requests (G. Rowley, pers. comm. 1987). 
More meaningful opportunities for participation were pro- 
vided by some civil servants responsible for social program 
delivery. For  example, housing  programs  in  the  N. W .T. and  the 
Arctic  Co-operatives  program across the  territorial  North  were 
administered in a fashion intended to evolve towards local 
control. Community-based  housing  and  cooperatives  associa- 
tions  were established, and  community  members  were  trained 
for administration  and service delivery. These initiatives  pro- 
vided  Native  people  with an opportunity to  develop the skills for 
dealing  with  state-provided  programs  and for taking  control  in 
their new life circumstances. 
This trend, however, was offset and  sometimes  subverted by 
an overall consolidation of federal control. Implementation of 
the new programs brought major changes to the structure of 
northern  administration  in Ottawa.  The Advisory  Committee  on 
Northern  Development  was  created  in 1948 as a  mechanism for 
interdepartmental coordination of northern policies and pro- 
grams. In 1954, the  Department of Resources  and  Development 
was  recast as the Department  of  Northern  Affairs  and  National 
Resources (DNANR), to emphasize that “the centre of gravity 
of the department  [was] being  moved north”  (Rea, 1968:47). 
In 1965, major responsibility for national Indian affairs was 
added to the portfolio, which  was  renamed  Indian  Affairs  and 
Northern  Development  in 1966. Expanding  budgets  and  admin- 
istrative  consolidation  in  Ottawa far outstripped  progress  towards 
democratization  in  communities  and  in  the  territorial legislative 
branches. 
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There  is  practical  consistency  in  the overall postwar  federal 
approach.  The  aspirations of federal  politicians  regarding exploi- 
tation of northern resources were compatible with  the  need to 
address  the  hardships  being  endured  by  northern  Native  people. 
The difficult circumstances of northern Natives appeared to 
southern civil servants to be a consequence of Native  people’s 
unpreparedness  for  wage  employment  and  the  absence of viable 
economic opportunities; the remedy was federal programs to 
develop a Native labour force and to create business and 
employment opportunities. Jobs were  to  be provided, ulti- 
mately,  in  the  mineral extraction projects  stimulated by the  new 
National Policy. 
The postwar federal approach also displays  the  two  contradic- 
tory strands in Canadian political ideology and practice. The 
interpretation of the  circumstances of northern  Native  people as 
a result of individual  disadvantage  is  fundamentally liberal, as  is 
the  solution  implied by this interpretation. In addition, all of the 
postwar state initiatives bore the stamp of Canada’s Tory 
beginnings.  The  northern  National Policy, the new social  wel- 
fare  programs,  and  even  the  forms of democratic  self-government 
were introduced from the top down. Administrators retained 
decision-making authority; political  control  was  devolved  very 
gradually. 
As it  turned out, neither  the  economic  development  strategy 
nor the programs to ameliorate Native people’s “disadvan- 
taged”  position  succeeded  in their longer  term  objectives. The 
“Roads to Resources” were built, but  he  North  did  not 
become a new  cornucopia of exportable  commodities. Health, 
education, and social welfare  programs  were  introduced effec- 
tively, but northerners remained in a disadvantaged position 
with respect to both the waged workforce and the political 
process. The explanation for the  short-term  administrative  suc- 
cess  and  longer  term  political fai ure of  these  federal  designs  did 
not  become clear until  the  Native  people’s  version  of  northern 
history  was  revealed  in  the 1970s, when  they  found a means  to 
make  themselves heard. 
THE  CHANGING  BALANCE OF POWER  IN  THE 1970s 
The  dramatic events of the 1970s can  be  understood  as  the 
cumulative effect of “the new National Policy” and  the  new 
federal  approach to northern Native administration. Both sets of 
policies  had  the  unforeseen  and  apparently  paradoxical effect of 
creating resistance to further state intervention. The paradox 
dissolves, however, when Native people’s experience of the 
policies is taken into account. 
Wartime and postwar interventions in the territorial North 
brought  mixed blessings. The material  circumstances of Native 
northerners  improved over the  hard years, when  trapping  had 
ceased to provide a good living and  when epidemic diseases  and 
occasionally famine visited. The new health care facilities, 
infusions of cash in the form of social welfare payments, 
improved  communications systems, and  government-provided 
houses  alleviated  many hardships. 
On the  other hand, the new life in  the settlements brought 
social  problems. The new settlements concentrated  populations 
at  unprecedented levels, straining the old  authority  patterns  and 
kin-based sharing relationships. In some cases, people were 
relocated far from their traditional  hunting  and  trapping areas, 
and for others there were  powerful  influences to hunt  and trap 
less: social  welfare  payments  became a regular  source of 
supplementary income in many households. The educational 
F. ABELE 
programs  separated  children  from their parents physically, as 
they  were  attending school, and  ultimately psychologically, as 
they absorbed a non-traditional education while missing the 
traditional  lessons of their elders  in  the communities.  A  sense of 
dislocation  from  traditional life and  the  lack of local  control  over 
the distribution of the new benefits made dealing with these 
problems difficult for  many individuals. Some  opportunities  for 
local  control  were created, but  the  success of these  only  under- 
lined  the  fundamental  lack of local  and  regional  control over 
other aspects of public life. 
“Province-like” control  remained  in  Ottawa  with  the  Depart- 
ment  of Indian  Affairs  and  Northern  Development,  which was 
reaching  the  zenith of its  power at the  end  of  the 1960s. Fattened 
on the  rapid  expansion  of federal northern programs, buoyed  by 
the government’s political commitment to northern resource 
development, the Ministry of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development  was a strong  second-string  influence  in  cabinet 
during  this period. Since the 1950s the northern  department  had 
used  regulatory  changes  and other forms of encouragement to 
support  exploration for northern  petroleum resources, but in two 
decades of exploration, very little oil or gas  had  been found. 
Finally in 1968, when a United States exploration company 
discovered  commercial quantities of oil in  Prudhoe Bay,  Alaska, 
it even appeared that the long search for northern petroleum 
resources  was  coming to an end, and  that he dream of economic 
growth based on a National Policy for the North would be 
realized. 
The  prospect of oil and gas development in the  North  raised 
for  Ottawa a complex  web of intersecting sovereignty, environ- 
mental,  and  economic  considerations.  These  were  confronted 
with  varying  degrees of creativity, but  no  new  model  of  eco- 
nomic development was proposed (Dosman, 1975; Bregha, 
1979). Federal officials began to plan the construction of a 
transportation corridor in  the Mackenzie Valley for Alaskan oil, 
in  anticipation of eventual Canadian discoveries. Prime  Minis- 
ter  Pierre  Trudeau  explained federal objectives by comparing 
the  proposed  Mackenzie  Valley  pipeline to the  Canadian Pacific 
Railway, which  had  opened  the  West for settlement  and  wheat 
production in the 19th century. The pipeline corridor would 
open  the  North to a new  wave  of  development  and  prosperity. 
This  time around,  however, the  federal  “Northern Vision” 
encountered  organized  regional resistance. The late 1960s were 
a period of national  mobilization  for the Native movement, pro- 
voked by the 1969 white paper on Indian policy. The white 
paper announced a new direction for Indian policy that was 
consistent  with  much of federal behaviour  in  the  postwar  period 
but  inconsistent  with  the  wishes of Indian people: it closed  the 
book on the past, including existing treaties and outstanding 
disputes, and  proposed  instead  the  assimilation of Indians  into 
the  mainstream of Canadian  society (Weaver, 1975). 
The  white  paper  galvanized  Native  protest  across  the  country. 
In the optimistic mood  of the early Trudeau years, the  federal 
response to Native protest was similar to  the  response to other 
social movements of the period. Funding was provided for 
organizations to represent activist youth and poor people, as 
well as for  Native  organizations  at the provincial, territorial, and 
national levels, on the  official  premise  that  the  solution to the 
problems identified by these groups was “participatory democ- 
racy”  (Weaver, 1975; Loney, 1977). 
During 1969-73, Native people across the territorial North 
formed  organizations  through  which to struggle for their  collec- 
tive interests. The Council for Yukon Indians (CYI)  represented 
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status and non-status Indians in the Yukon Territory. The 
Committee for Original Peoples’ Entitlement (COPE), the Indian 
Brotherhood of the N.W.T. (IBNWT), and  the Metis Associa- 
tion of the N.W.T. represented the Inuvialuit, Dene, and  Metis 
of the western N. W.T. The Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC) was 
organized by the Inuit of the Eastern Arctic. All of these 
organizations eventually received federal funding. The status 
Indian organizations were funded by Indian Affairs; the others 
were funded by the Department of the Secretary of State as part 
of that  department’s  responsibility  to  promote  “citizen 
participation.” 
The existence of the aboriginal organizations introduced a 
new factor in territorial political life. In the N.W.T., leaders of 
the IBNWT (later the Dene Nation) reacted quickly to the news 
that a major pipeline project was  intended for their territory. 
Believing that the disruptions that  would attend this aevelop- 
ment  were uncontrollable and potentially very dangerous, they 
commenced court action to freeze development on the land 
through  which the pipeline was to pass. In 1973 they received a 
favourable decision in the Supreme Court of the N.W.T. 
(Dosman, 1975). To further strengthen their position, the Native 
leaders successfully sought support from the churches, southern 
environmental groups, and academics. 
In the end, there  was sufficient pressure to cause the minority 
Liberal government in Ottawa to appoint a commission of 
inquiry  to investigate “the terms  and conditions” under which a 
pipeline could be constructed in the Mackenzie Valley. Thomas 
Berger, a former New Democratic Party politician, Native 
rights lawyer, and British Columbia Supreme Court Justice, 
was appointed to conduct the inquiry. 
Berger  led a wide-ranging and well-publicized inquiry  during 
1974-76. He heard testimony from hundreds of northerners, 
including  an  unprecedented  number  of Native northerners whose 
participation was facilitated by the use of translators and a 
culturally appropriate hearing format. The Berger Inquiry was 
significant for many reasons: it became the forum for a cathartic 
national debate about the assumptions underlying economic 
growth; the innovative procedures for social and environmental 
impact assessment developed during the inquiry set a precedent 
in  northern decision making; the inquiry process itself  delayed a 
federal decision about pipeline construction until it became 
clear that the project was inadvisable; and perhaps most  impor- 
tantly, participation in the inquiry  provided  Native people in the 
Mackenzie  Valley  with a unique opportunity for political partic- 
ipation  and consolidation, while northern  Native organizations 
in general gained new national recognition (Berger, 1977; Page, 
1986; Dosman, 1978; Bregha, 1979). 
As the inquiry proceeded, regional Native organizations in 
both territories were engaged in a process of political develop- 
ment. Part of this development took place through participation 
in inquiries and hearings (such as the Berger Inquiry and the 
Lysyk Inquiry on the proposed Alaska Highway Pipeline in 
Yukon). A great deal of the political mobilization, however, 
was the result of grass-roots and community-building work 
undertaken by Native people themselves, in southern  Canada as 
well as in the North. 
The Nishga [Indians] of British Columbia took the issue of 
their land rights to the Supreme Court. They lost the case on a 
legal technicality but achieved a decision that acknowledged 
that Native peoples who had  not signed treaties did have a form 
of aboriginal entitlement. Native political mobilization and this 
ruling prompted a formal reversal of federal policy. In 1973, the 
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federal  government  announced  its  willingness  to  negotiate  aborig- 
inal land claims for those areas of Canada not covered by 
treaties. 
By 1975, all of the northern  Native organizations had  submit- 
ted “land claims proposals” to the federal government that 
claimed far more  than  real estate; each called for a fundamental 
readjustment in their relationship to the federal state, based 
upon Native peoples’ interpretation of their own situation and 
proposing  new  models of self-government that  blended tradi- 
tional governing forms with liberal democratic principles. Their 
goal  was to establish regional governments through  which  they 
could have sufficient control to ensure their survival as 
collectivities (Dacks, 1981; Page, 1986; Watkins, 1977). 
The initial federal response to the first wave  of claims 
proposals  was negative. There were  panicky references to the 
undesirability  of “ethnic governments” from federal politicians 
who clearly had one eye on the progress of the Parti Quebecois 
and the impending referendum on sovereignty association in 
Quebec,  which  would  have  placed  Quebec  in a semi-autonomous 
position  in the Canadian federation. By the early 1980s, how- 
ever, it was clear that the Native organizations had gained 
considerable ground. 
First, federal policy  had recognized in 1973 the legitimacy of 
“comprehensive” Native land claims, completely reversing the 
1969 policy that promoted the eradication of all “special 
rights” for aboriginal people. Procedures for negotiation  and a 
system for funding claims research by loans against an eventual 
settlement were in place. While federal claims policy excluded 
negotiation for Native governments, in the negotiation  process 
itself some para-governmental structures were contemplated. 
Second, all of the organizations had developed strategies for 
working towards greater self-government outside the claims 
process. The CY1 had decided to work towards improving 
existing Yukon government programs where possible, rather 
than  to attempt to develop a totally separate system of services 
for their memberships. The N.W.T. Native organizations were 
participating in territorial electoral politics and  were  using  this 
forum to advance their political goals, and the Inuit had imple- 
mented a system of regional councils within their territory to 
promote  broadly  based participation. 
Third, through their national federations, Native organiza- 
tions from across the country waged a successful campaign to 
entrench “existing” aboriginal rights in the constitution, as 
well as a five-year process to specify the meaning of aboriginal 
rights at a series of First Ministers’ Conferences (meetings of the 
prime minister and the provincial premiers). Some progress had 
been  made towards entrenching collective rights for aboriginal 
people. 
Fourth, across the North, the Native organizations were 
recognized as legitimate representatives of their memberships 
on Native issues, and it had become a regular governmental 
practice to consult both the organizations and  Native people in 
general when decisions were being made that might affect them. 
Fifth, as a result of Native participation in the well-publicized 
Berger hearings, Berger’s widely read final report, and political 
initiatives of the Native organizations, the official analytical 
framework regarding northern development had  been expanded. 
It  was no longer possible for attentive observers to sustain an 
interpretation in which Native people were seen simply as 
“disadvantaged’ ’ Canadians. The title of Berger’s report, North- 
ern  Frontier,  Northern  Homeland, concisely expressed the new 
image of North, which recognized that there were both  Native 
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and non-Native versions of northern history, leading to two 
visions of the future. 
All of these changes were felt sharply in both territories, 
where the local balance of political power had shifted deci- 
sively. The Native organizations provided a means  for  Native 
people to express their views. The change was perhaps most 
rapid  in  the N.W.T. In 1975, the Territorial Council  was 
dominated by non-Natives  hostile  to  Native  political  goals  and 
strongly supporting the Mackenzie Valley pipeline; just four 
years later, N.W.T. voters  elected a new legislature composed 
of a Native  majority  and  non-Native  representatives  who  were 
determined to respond to Native concerns. 
In Yukon, a similar electoral adjustment  came more slowly. 
In 1979, Yukoners  introduced  party  politics in territorial elec- 
tions  and  almost  immediately  were  granted  responsible  govern- 
ment  by  the  short-lived  federal  Conservative  government  led  by 
Joe Clark. (The  same  provision  was  not  made for the N.W.T., 
where parties did  not  then  and still do not  participate  in  territo- 
rial elections.) 
The Progressive Conservatives, who  formed  the  first  Yukon 
government  after  the  introduction  of  party politics, elected  only 
one Native member, but in 1985 the next territorial election 
returned a New  Democrat  majority.  In  this government, Native 
people  were  represented  proportionately to their  numbers  in  the 
territory. The new government in Yukon, like the post-1979 
Legislative  Assembly  in  the N.W.T., included also non-Native 
members who had concluded that it was in their interest to 
understand and to accommodate the Native position on key 
political issues, because  the extreme political  polarization of the 
1970s had led to stalemate in both territories (Dacks, 1981; 
Whittington, 1985). 
A  NEW  POLITICAL  LANDSCAPE 
The 1970s represented a period  of dramatic confrontation  and 
radical realignment of the balance of political forces in the 
North. In the 1980s, northerners faced a new political land- 
scape, in  which  more  room - though no  one was clear how 
much more  room - was available for aboriginal  and  regional 
self-government. 
Certainly, DIAND’s  monopoly  on  northern  policy  was  shat- 
tered. In  part  this  was a consequence of greater  involvement of 
other, more  powerful  ministries  in  northern  development. The 
chaos  in  world  energy relations during  the 1970s drew  cabinet 
attention to the  development of a national  energy policy, with 
the  result  that  the  Department of Energy, Mines  and  Resources 
assumed  much  greater  responsibility for northern oil and gas 
development (Bregha, 1979; Doern and Toner, 1983). Other 
departments  had  developed relationships with  northerners,  as  in 
the case of Secretary of State funding for some Native 
organizations. 
DIAND’s influence was eroded from “below” as well: 
Native people now dealt with the federal state from a much 
stronger position, through organizations capable  of  sustained 
political activity, and  both territorial governments  were  repre- 
senting northern interests with greater legitimacy and persis- 
tence. Although both northern governments still resembled 
colonies in their legal position, administered through federal 
legislation,  in  practice  both  had  moved  much  closer to “province- 
like” authority during the 1970s. 
These  developments  indicated a shift in  political  initiative  to 
the  North,  but  not to a permanent  transfer  of power. Constitu- 
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tionally  and legally, control  remained  in Ottawa, constrained 
only by the  energy  and  solidarity  with  which  northerners  exploited 
their de  facto political advantage. 
CONTRARY TRENDS IN THE 1980s 
Federal government practices in the territorial North were 
transformed  during  the 1970s through  the  political  mobilization 
of northern Native people and their new alliance with non- 
Native northerners. Some political power was devolved, as 
consultation  about  major  projects  and funding for  representative 
Native  organizations  became  routine  and as the  territorial  gov- 
ernments  moved  towards  more province-like behaviour.  Fed- 
eral economic  intervention  in  the  North  was  obstructed  partially 
by these forces. Further, some  basis  was  laid  for  an  ideological 
and constitutional accommodation of Native objectives for 
collective  self-determination  in  the  elaboration of processes  for 
negotiation  of  comprehensive claims and  with  the  recognition f 
“existing aboriginal rights” in  the  new constitution. 
In the 1980s, the contradictions inherent in these changes 
became  more apparent. Federal  action  in  two  areas  underlined 
the limits to northern influence over northern affairs. The 
imperatives  of  national  energy  policy  brought a boom  and  then a
bust to the territorial economies, and the resolution of the 
national constitutional process  through  the  Meech  Lake  Accord 
produced significant setbacks for all  northerners  and for Native 
northerners  in  particular. At the same time, in the North, two 
processes  were  launched  that  provided  an  alternative  model  for 
decision  making  on  constitutional  and  economic  development. 
In  the 1980s, the  federal  government  exercised  executive  author- 
ity  in secret negotiations, while  political  leaders  in  the  territories 
created  broadly based, broadly  democratic deliberative forums. 
Two Federal  Initiatives 
The federal legislation establishing the  framework of govern- 
ment  in  the  two territories grants to the territorial  governments 
province-like legislative powers, with one major exception. As 
was  the case for Alberta  and  Saskatchewan  before 1930, juris- 
diction over  “Crown  land” is  retained by the federal level of 
the state. Thus the territories lack  the  economic  power  exercised 
by provinces  in  taxing  and  regulating  non-renewable  resource 
development. 
The world energy “crisis” that began in 1973 created a 
situation  in  which federal control  of  northern  resources  gained 
new importance.  The crisis prompted  major  revision of Cana- 
dian energy policy, culminating in the announcement of the 
National  Energy  Policy (NEP) in  January 1980. The NEP was 
promoted  as a program  to  achieve  the  dual  goals  of 
“Canadianization” of a significant portion of the foreign- 
controlled energy sector and  national  self-sufficiency  in  energy 
supply.  Principal  mechanisms for achieving  self-sufficiency  in 
energy  were  various  kinds of subsidies to encourage  exploration 
and  development  of  petroleum  reserves  in  the  federally  con- 
trolled land in the two territories (referred to in the NEP as 
“Canada  Lands”). 
The NEP was  developed by a relatively  small group of senior 
federal officials, without consultation with northerners or, in 
fact, with the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development  (Doern  and Toner, 1985; Pratt, 1982). Implemen- 
tation of the NEP produced an energy boom in the western 
N.W.T. and significantly increased activity elsewhere in the 
N.W.T.  andinYukon. EspeciallyintheN.W.T.,theboomwas 
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boosted  by  another project, to  expand  the  oil  production  system 
at  Norman  Wells  and  construct  a  small  diameter  pipeline  along 
the  Mackenzie  Valley  south  from  Norman  Wells to Alberta. The 
smaller Norman Wells project was approved by the federal 
government just four  years after Berger’s  recommendation  that 
there  be  a  ten-year  moratorium  on  pipeline construction. There 
was ongoing  opposition by Native organizations. 
With  the  completion of the  construction  phase of the  Norman 
Wells project, and the withdrawal of the NEP by the new 
Conservative  government after 1984, northerners  faced  a  sud- 
den  collapse of petroleum  industry  employment opportunities. 
Both the boom and the bust were economic events of major 
consequence over which  northern  residents  had  no control. 
More effective participation was possible in the process 
through  which  the  Canadian constitution was patriated, but  in 
the  end  insufficient opportunities for participation  were  permit- 
ted. Northern  Native  people joined the  successful  campaign by 
Native  people  from across the  country to entrench  affirmation of 
“existing aboriginal  and  treaty rights” in  the  new constitution. 
It  was  evident  that federal, provincial  and  Native  representa- 
tives held widely diverging views about what these rights 
entailed. Accordingly, to the section  affirming  aboriginal  rights 
was  added  another  that  provided for a  series of conferences of 
first ministers and national Native leaders to determine what 
was meant by this phrase (Constitution, 1982, Sec. 35, 37). 
Representatives of territorial  governments  attended  the  patriation 
meetings but were not parties to the agreement. Both the 
territorial  governments  and  national  Native  organizations  par- 
ticipated  in  the  First  Ministers Conferences (FMCs)  on  aborigi- 
nal  and  treaty rights. 
In 1987, the  constitutionally  required  First  Ministers  Confer- 
ences  concluded  without  agreement on the  meaning of “exist- 
ing  aboriginal rights,” leaving  open  the  question of when or 
how this  fundamental  issue  will  be decided. Just one month  after 
the  failure of  the last FMC on aboriginal rights, another  First 
Ministers  Conference  reached  an  accord  among  the  provincial 
premiers  and  the  prime minister on the  terms by  which  Quebec 
would enter the  new  Canadian constitution. This Meech  Lake 
Accord included an agreement to revise the constitutional 
amendment  process.  If  the  accord  is ratified, the  establishment 
of  new provincial boundaries, formation  of  new provinces, and 
reform of federal institutions will require agreement of the 
federal  government  and  all  ten provinces. In  the 1982 version of 
the constitution, these changes  required  only  the  agreement of 
the federal government  and  seven of  ten provinces, representing 
50% of  the  Canadian population. 
Neither  the  territorial  governments  nor  the  national  Native 
organizations  were  invited to attend  the  meetings  that  produced 
the  Meech  Lake Accord. Native leaders reacted  angrily  to  the 
accord, not  because  they  opposed  resolution of Quebec’s  consti- 
tutional position, but  because their own  distinct  societies had so 
recently  been  disappointed by the same  assembly of provincial 
and  federal leaders. Inuit leader John Amagoalik  commented 
in a  television  interview: “If Quebec  is  a  distinct society, what 
are we? Chopped liver?” 
The accord’s amending  formula  is  another  source of concern 
for  both  Native  leaders  and  the  territorial  governments. It eems 
clear  that  eventual  provincial status for the  territories  will  be 
much  more difficult to achieve, and  changes to northern  repre- 
sentation - in, for example, the Senate - could  be  effected 
without  territorial agreement. While no northern leader expects 
or demands  provincial status for either territory  in  the  near te m, 
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all  are  concerned  about  the  long-term  implications of the  Meech 
Lake  Accord. 
Two  Territorial  Initiatives 
Independently of the federally led national initiatives in 
energy policy and constitutional development, the territorial 
governments addressed fundamental regional economic and 
constitutional questions during the 1980s. In each territory, 
processes  were  established  that  stand  in  remarkable  contrast to 
those  at  the  national level. 
Since early 1980, residents of the N.W.T. have  been  partici- 
pating in a process of territorial constitution-building. The 
process was born in the new spirit of accommodation and 
cooperation  attending  the 1979 territorial election. The Legisla- 
tive Assembly created a “Constitutional Alliance” to bring 
members  of  the  Legislative  Assembly  together  with  leaders  of 
territorial  Native  organizations  in  a  forum to promote  discussion 
of future  territorial  government structures. Two  public confer- 
ences  were  held  for  this purpose. 
Then, in 1982, Inuit  members  of  the  Legislative  Assembly 
asked the Assembly to hold a plebiscite on division of the 
N.W.T. They  argued  that  division  would  provide  more  demo- 
cratic  government  for their constituents in  the  Eastern  Arctic by 
bringing  the seat of government closer than  Yellowknife,  which 
is  hundreds of kilometres  away from any  Inuit communities, 
and by bringing territorial boundaries into line with the area 
expected  to  be  included  in  the  Inuit  land claim. 
The Inuit  proposal  was  supported by other members  of  the 
Assembly. In 1983, the  plebiscite  was held, and  division  was 
supported by 85% of the  (predominantly  Inuit)  residents of  the 
eastern N.W.T. and  by 56% of territorial  voters overall. In  light 
of this result, the Constitutional Alliance divided into the 
Western  Constitutional  Forum  (WCF)  and  the  Nunavut  Consti- 
tutional  Forum (NCF), so that  northerners’  constitutional dis- 
cussions could be focused upon development of separate 
constitutions for two new territories. 
Each  forum  launched  a  process of constitutional  discussion 
that  included  repeated visits to northern communities, research, 
and  the  publication  of  background papers, working documents, 
pamphlets,  and  newsletters  in  English  and  Native languages. 
Forum representatives met frequently in joint session, often 
publicly. The NCF reached  consensus  on  a  constitution for the 
proposed  new  eastern territory, to be called Nunavut,  while  the 
WCF,  working  with  a  much  more  heterogeneous  population  in 
the  western N.W.T., made considerable progress. 
None  of  this activity, however, could  actually  produce new 
territorial constitutions. Legally, division of the N.W.T. is a 
federal prerogative. Nine  months after the plebiscite, the  then 
Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, John 
Munro,  agreed to accept the plebiscite decision, but  he  attached 
a  number  of  rather stringent and  imprecise  conditions  that  would 
have  to be fulfilled  before  division  could  proceed  (Abele  and 
Dickerson, 1985). These conditions have  been  relaxed  some- 
what  by later ministers. There  has been  a  complicated  period of 
negotiation  among  northerners  about division, and  most  recently 
about the exact location of the  new  boundary  that  will divide the 
two  territories.  Many different interests must  be  satisfied  in  an 
extremely  unstable political setting; in  the  meantime,  the  issue 
remains  unresolved. 
In the Yukon, the political landscape is quite different. 
Constitutional questions were  resolved  for  the  short  term  with 
the  introduction  of  party  politics  and  the  achievement of r spon- 
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sible government in 1979. Territorial politics are  complex  and 
often heated, and large questions about  the economic future of 
the territory remain. 
As in the N.W.T., perhaps the greatest political divide in 
Yukon  has  been between some non-Native business interests 
strongly favourable to non-renewable resource development 
and Native  people  working  through the claims and other pro- 
cesses to  gain control over the pace  and direction of economic 
and political change. Yukon Indians, who constitute just one- 
third of the Yukon population, came very close to concluding a 
comprehensive claims agreement in 1984. They  have partici- 
pated in electoral politics through all three political parties. 
Non-Natives  are a diverse group, including a local economic 
elite, many  of  whom are second- or third-generation Yukoners, 
independent placer miners, and a growing number of perma- 
nently resident professionals, artists, and white collar workers. 
All  have different, although sometimes intersecting, economic 
interests. 
Yukon economic health depends upon a few mines, govern- 
ment expenditures, and  an associated service sector. The vola- 
tility of the heavily subsidized mining sector has  meant  wild 
fluctuations in levels of unemployment and frequent infusions 
of federal “emergency” capital to prevent  mine  closures (Coates, 
1985). 
In 1985, the new  Yukon government introduced a number of 
measures intended to repair the wide breaches dividing the 
Yukon electorate. Probably the  most innovative new  measure is 
Yukon 2000, a participatory planning process  intended to 
produce a long-term economic development strategy. The pro- 
cess is designed to unfold over several years, incorporating 
conferences in  which participants representing various strands 
of opinion work  through small groups to achieve consensus, 
supported by wide-ranging research papers. It is too early to 
comment upon the outcome of this process, but to date all 
sectors of Yukon society have  worked successfully through the 
early  phases of consensus building. 
SUMMARY 
These examples of federal and territorial behaviour  highlight 
some salient trends. On the federal side are two  major initiatives 
- one economic, the other constitutional - that conform in 
some respects to the patterns of Canadian development identi- 
fied earlier. The National Energy Program treated the territorial 
North as an internal colony. Developed  without  northern con- 
sultation, the NEP deployed northern energy resources “in the 
national interest” using regulations and subsidies to implement 
a particular economic strategy. The territorial governments and 
aboriginal organizations were excluded from the secret negotia- 
tions  that  produced the Meech Lake Accord  and thus lacked the 
means to defend their interests at a crucial stage in the develop- 
ment  of the new constitution. 
Clearly, the old patterns have not  been abandoned: develop- 
ment  proceeded despite outstanding Native claims, while the 
penultimate national constitutional agreement ignored the inter- 
ests of both Native people and northerners. Yet in federal 
behaviour there are contradictory elements. The NEP’s “Can- 
ada Lands” are the same lands that are considered by northern 
Native societies to  be their lands. That the Native societies have 
some claim to the land has  been acknowledged in federal policy, 
which includes provisions for working out a practical resolution 
of conflicting federal and Native interests. Although the territo- 
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rial economies are still controlled by Ottawa, the  Department of 
Indian Affairs and Northern Development has continued to 
devolve other governing responsibilities to the territorial level. 
And while the Meech Lake part of the constitutional process 
excluded  both  Native  and territorial participation, their partici- 
pation  was  both  permitted  and effective at earlier stages. It is 
still possible, too, that their interests will  be recognized before 
the  accord is ratified. Further, it was, after all, federal funding 
that enabled the two northern deliberative processes to take 
place, and  in the case of the constitutional development process, 
at least, federal policy  has  had  to  respond to the results. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This essay began  with the claim that recent northern political 
history is evocative for Canadians because it compresses into 
sharp focus basic national issues  and fundamental patterns of 
Canadian development. Specifically, four areas of congruence 
have  been identified. 
First, northern constitutional development bears the mark of 
Canada’s colonial heritage. The Tory conception of the role of 
the state recognizes that  market forces alone cannot  be  relied 
upon to build a national economy or to keep it functioning; 
nothing could have  been clearer to the representatives of the four 
colonies who conceived Confederation. The same imperatives 
that  led them to confederate led also to the creation of the Yukon 
and  Northwest Territories. The same tradition of colonial domi- 
nation shaped federal administration of these territories and 
permitted their exclusion from a crucial stage in the renegotia- 
tion of the terms of federation, which is now  nearly completed. 
Second, it is clear that the strategy for national economic 
development formulated by the fathers of Confederation, the 
National  Policy implemented by Prime Minister John A. Mac- 
Donald, persists. The dream of a northern version of the 
National Policy recurred repeatedly during the 20th century, 
and dreamlike, it evaporated again  and again in the cold light of 
economic reality. 
Third, like the westward-looking National Policy of the 19th 
century, the northern version eventually provoked regional 
resistance. The resistance included the broad mobilization of 
previously excluded populations, and it was manifested in a 
broadly democratic and participatory format contrasting sharply 
with the undemocratic federal policies that gave it birth. 
Fourth, northern political development helped to place on the 
national agenda unfinished business related to the rights of the 
original inhabitants of Canada, of the real founding nations  who 
were not included in the “two nations” compromise of the 
British  North  America Act. Accommodation of cultural particu- 
larity  and collective rights with respect to Native people has 
proven quite indigestible, constitutionally and ideologically, 
but mysteriously amenable to some progress at the practical 
level. 
The original pragmatic Tory compromise with  Quebec  was 
buried  in the BNA  Act references to “denominational schools” 
and rules for the use of French in certain legislatures. It required 
120 years for explicit constitutional recognition of Quebec as ‘‘a 
distinct society” to occur. The spectre of more “distinct” 
societies haunted those federal politicians who reacted with 
horror to Native demands for governments that  permitted  the 
survival of their collectivities. In the long gestation of Canada, 
though, the particularity of Quebec was finally recognized. A 
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precedent  is established that  may  prove  useful  in the long term 
for aboriginal people. 
The parallels between northern constitutional and  economic 
development and other national processes are on reflection 
perhaps  not  very surprising. More interesting, I think, are the 
differences. History never really repeats itself, because what 
has gone before limits and shapes the changes that come after, 
and because human beings are capable of acting in awareness of 
their history. 
Sometimes, of course, people act as if they  were  unconscious 
of prior experience: this is the  lesson of the recurring National 
Policy dream. In varying  world economic settings, both  Liberal 
and Conservative politicians have expended large amounts of 
public  money in attempts to replicate a probably unique national 
feat. The Canadian experience with the northern  version of the 
National  Policy  and the evidence from other nations suggest  that 
a development strategy based  upon commodity exports is insuf- 
ficient, if ony because commodity prices and world markets 
fluctuate uncontrollably and disappear unpredictably. 
Not all northern  history  has  been lived unconsciously, how- 
ever. Native people’s consciousness of their own  history  has 
shaped  and strengthened their political project to decolonize and 
to protect their collectivities. In turn, these actions expose a 
fundamental tension in Canadian political ideology. It is the 
tension between the liberal understanding of a state founded 
upon the political and economic rights of the individual and  the 
Tory constitutional practice of compromise, accommodation, 
and state intervention. 
Native people and northerners have  reacted against both  the 
liberal and Tory elements of Canadian government. Liberal 
ideology  was expressed most  baldly  in the 1969 white  paper on 
Indian policy, and generally in the redefinition of Native people 
as “disadvantaged” Canadians who required the removal of 
barriers to their individual participation in the mainstream. This 
view clearly misunderstood the strength of Native collectivities 
and the importance to them of their collective rights. On the 
other hand, northerners - both Native and  non-Native - have 
resisted the heavy  hand of Tory colonialism. They demand the 
same level of self-determination as other Canadians, as well as, 
for  Native people, collective rights. 
Paradoxically, both strands in the Canadian constitutional 
tradition, as they have confronted Quebec nationalism and 
regional differences, have created a notably open-ended politi- 
cal setting in  which the terms of the federation are frequently 
renegotiated. Native people have entered these negotiations 
now, taking advantage of both ideological tendencies. The 
liberal strand in Canadian politics requires that citizens have 
equal rights to participation, and so funding is provided to 
eliminate differences in citizens’ capacities to contribute. Tory 
pragmatism and willingness to compromise with  particularity 
makes constitutional recognition of “distinct societies” with 
special rights within Canada both comprehensible and possible. 
Perhaps the most ironic legacy of  Canada’s Tory beginnings 
lies in the propensity of this state-led development strategy to 
provoke an insistently democratic form of resistance. Here 
Native people and northerners joined the ranks of other Canadi- 
ans  who resisted imposition of the designs of a governing elite. 
There are particulary northern reasons for the democratic pat- 
tern of northern politics: the population is small, and the 
traditions of aboriginal societies are directly democratic. To 
understand, however, the tenacity with  which northern practice 
and northern demands have focused on the question of self- 
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government, it is necessary also to recall their vivid experience 
of colonialism. Northerners seek to implement just what is 
denied by colonial administration. 
So how does Canada survive? As the northern case illus- 
trates, we survive amidst ideological contradictions and we 
struggle over issues that  may appear to be arcane, particularis- 
tic, or “just regional.” Regional issues, however, are also 
national. They continue to be the basic issues of Canadian 
political life, and  they are the source of the Canadian compro- 
mise  and innovation. 
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